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1. Introduction 
The main goal of most public pension reforms implemented in many countries over the last 
decades has been to improve government finances in the long run. They are a policy response 
to population ageing, which will increase problems of fiscal sustainability of welfare states. 
Most pension reforms have been designed to strengthen government finances by encouraging 
employment, and thereby tax revenues, in order to mitigate unpopular benefit cuts. 1 In 
particular, a key objective has been to increase the effective retirement age. At the same time, 
the reforms have typically tried to maintain much of the redistributive effects built into the 
former public pension systems. These goals and concerns also characterize the Norwegian 
pension reform implemented in 2011. The purpose of this paper is to assess as realistically as 
possible to what extent the Norwegian reform is likely to improve government finances in the 
long run.  
     A long run perspective on the fiscal reform effects is particularly relevant for Norway, 
because the government finances look impressively solid in a short and medium-term 
perspective, as opposed to most other OECD economies. This reflects the fiscal rule 
implemented in 2001, which implies that the large government petroleum revenues are saved 
in a sovereign wealth fund. The fund assets passed 2.3 times GDP by the end of 2014. 
However, the projections in this paper show that also Norway faces severe fiscal 
sustainability problems in the long run, since ageing combined with prolongation of the 
present welfare schemes implies that government expenditures will outgrow the tax bases 
after 2025.2 At the same time, the solid government finances have allowed Norway to 
emphasize the long run properties of the new public pension system to a stronger degree than 
countries already struggling with strained government finances.  
                                                          
1 OECD (2013a) provides an overview of pension reforms in the OECD-area in recent years. 
2 These long run problems of fiscal sustainability in Norway have been pointed out in several reports and papers; see e.g. 
Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) and the Ministry of Finance (2013). 
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     A profound analysis of pension reforms is a demanding modelling task because it should 
integrate three types of effects.3 First, huge amounts of details are required to provide an 
operational and relevant description of the reform elements, such as e.g. threshold values, 
coordination with occupational private pension schemes, special arrangements for low-
income groups, temporary rules phased out during transition periods and other exceptions 
from main principles. In addition the model should capture the heterogeneity of individual 
earning profiles and other aspects of individual life courses. Such details are not only 
important for the re-distributional properties of the system, but also for accurate computations 
of the aggregate public pension expenditures. Dynamic Microsimulation (DMS) models 
provide such details, which make them frequently used by the authorities to compute effects 
on individual benefits and public pension expenditures. Flood (2007), Morrison (2007), 
Blanchet and Minez (2009) and Leombruni and Mosca (2014) are but a few examples of 
studies using DMS models to estimate mechanical pension reform effects. Norwegian studies 
in this tradition include Fredriksen and Stølen (2007, 2011 and 2014). The Norwegian 
authorities have also used DMS models in the reform preparations. This practice seems to be 
an exception compared with pension reform preparations in other countries. 
     Second, realistic estimates should capture that pension reforms indeed intend to affect 
behaviour, notably labour supply. A vast empirical literature has studied how pension 
schemes affect labour supply, especially through retirement; see Gruber and Wise (2004) for a 
comprehensive overview. In their summary of 12 comparable microeconometric country 
studies, Gruber and Wise conclude that the pension system has a “strong effect on 
retirement”. Possible effects on labour supply are therefore also included in several of the 
DMS models in addition to the mechanical effects. This is also the case for the Norwegian 
DMS-analyses mentioned above. Analyses of observed patterns in the first years after the 
Norwegian pension reform confirm significant reform effects on the age of retirement; see 
Hernæs et al. (2016).  
     Third, the mechanical and the behavioural responses to plausible pension reforms are 
likely to be strong enough to cause significant general equilibrium repercussions in a long run 
perspective, motivating the use of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models in pension 
reform analyses. A good illustration of the potential power of equilibrium effects is Coile and 
Gruber (2003). Their estimated effects on the budget deficit of a US Social Security reform 
reflect just the expansion of tax bases, whereas actuarial mechanisms leave expenditures 
                                                          
3 Galaasen, Holmøy and Stølen (2015) survey model based studies of pension reforms. 
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almost unaffected. In a study of a Norwegian pension reform proposal, also Holmøy and 
Stensnes (2008) find a stronger fiscal contribution from expansion of tax bases than from 
lower pension expenditures. Beetsma, Bettendorf and Broer (2003) and Bovenberg and Knaap 
(2005) use CGE models with overlapping generations (OLG) in the tradition pioneered by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to assess budget and economic consequences of stylized 
pension reforms in the Netherlands. Fehr (2009) surveys the use of stochastic CGE models in 
analyses of population ageing and pension reforms. Relatively recent topics in this literature 
include the transition between steady states, uncertainty and risk sharing, social efficiency 
effects, as well as inter- and intra-generational income distribution effects. Papers addressing 
these issues include e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999), Krueger and Kubler (2006), Nishiyama 
and Smetters (2007), Fehr and Habermann (2008), Harenberg and Ludwig (2014). Fehr, 
Haberman and Kindermann (2008) introduce hyperbolic discounting in an analysis of the 
welfare effects of the German social security system. Hirte (2002) introduced optimal 
retirement in an OLG model. Such behavior is also included in the analyses of stylized 
pension reforms in Eisensee (2006), Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann (2012) and Imrohorglu 
and Kitao (2012), as well as in the studies of Spanish pension reform in Díaz-Giménez and 
Díaz-Saavedra (2009) and Sánchez Martín (2010). Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2012) introduce 
both optimal retirement and benefit claiming in a dynamic stochastic OLG-CGE model of the 
US economy. Galaasen (2014a, 2014b) uses the same modelling approach in a study of the 
Norwegian pension reform of 2011.  
     This study of the fiscal effects of the Norwegian pension reform of 2011 takes the three 
abovementioned types of effects into account by combining a detailed DMS model with a 
CGE model.4 Since our DMS model captures all details in the former and the new pension 
system, as well as an almost complete representation of the relevant population heterogeneity, 
we are able to produce more accurate estimates of the public pension expenditures than pure 
CGE analyses, contingent on individual age-earnings profiles. Whereas most of the papers 
referred to above study stylized reforms, the ability to account for details allow us to address 
the effects of an actual pension reform. Our CGE model is designed to capture those 
mechanisms that are most important in analyses of long run fiscal effects. In particular, it 
provides a rather detailed determination of the bases for direct taxes levied on households and 
the business sector, as well as indirect taxes. Our paper shares the same main purpose and 
approach as Holmøy and Stensnes (2008), but differs from the latter and other previous 
                                                          
4 Linking micro- and macroeconomic models is discussed by Cockburn, Savard and Tiberti (2014). 
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Norwegian reform studies by analysing the implemented reform rather than reform proposals, 
by providing another set of sensitivity analyses, and by considering other mechanisms for 
neutralizing the fiscal reform effects through tax adjustments. As in Holmøy and Stensnes 
(2008), changes in government revenues through adjustments of the bases of indirect and 
business taxes, are the most important general equilibrium effects included in the present 
analysis. From table 3 it is evident that the percentage reform effects deviate quite a lot 
between different income components and a CGE model is necessary to capture these effects 
properly.  
     The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the main 
elements of the present Norwegian pension system and the implemented reform. Section 3 
describes the microsimulation and the CGE models. Section 4 discusses the effects of the 
reform on total employment. Section 5 discusses the overall reform effects on government 
finances. Section 6 analyses the robustness of the reform effects with respect to assumptions 
on longevity, labour supply responses, withdrawal of benefits, and the degree of protecting 
the former disabled old-age pensioners from the actuarial mechanisms built into the new 
pension system. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Norwegian public pension reform 
2.1 The former system 
The old National Insurance System was established in 1967. Over time this public pension 
system has developed as a mandatory, defined benefit, pay-as-you-go pension system. 
Christensen et al. (2012) and Fredriksen and Stølen (2014) describe its main elements. 
Although the new system was implemented in 2011, the accrual of entitlements is still entirely 
based on the rules from the old system for new cohorts of pensioners born up to 1953. The 
new rules for accrual of entitlements will gradually be phased in for cohorts born between 
1954 and 1963. In the old system the accrual of entitlements for old-age benefits were 
determined according to the formula: 
     Pension benefit = universal benefit + max(special supplement, income benefit). 
     The income benefit is based on pension entitlements accrued through labour market 
earnings after 1967. In addition, imputed pension entitlements are granted to parents caring 
for young children and recipients of social security benefits compensating for unemployment, 
sickness, rehabilitation, and disability. Both entitlements and benefits have in principle been 
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wage indexed, although practice in past periods has tended to fall somewhat short of this 
intention. In the stylised case where an individual earns the average wage for 40 years, the 
after-tax replacement ratio of the public old age benefit is about 65 percent.5  
     Some of the elements for accrual of pension entitlements according to the old system are 
made more actuarial after the reform. Most important is full accumulation of entitlements 
between the average wage level and 115 per cent of this level with the new system against 
only 1/3 with the old. There is also some contribution from the abolishment of the rule 
according to which a full benefit requires 40 years of accumulation, and the best-years rule 
saying that entitlements will only be calculated using the 20 years with highest earnings. On 
average, these non-linear elements resulted in a relatively weak income dependency of 
pension benefits with the old system. Simulations with the microsimulation model used in this 
paper, show that the new system for accrual of entitlements at average reduces the overall 
marginal tax rate on labour incomes by 15.7 percentage points with the new system against 10 
percentage points with the old, see Stensnes (2007). Moreover, this income dependency is 
hard to compute ex ante, and varies highly across individuals, which probably weakens the 
labour supply incentive of the income dependency. 
     With the former system the formal retirement age was 67 years up to 2010. But about 60 
percent of the (still) employed at the age of 62 were entitled to an early retirement from this 
age. In addition roughly 40 percent of the population received disability benefits at the age of 
67. Disability pension and early retirement thus imply that the present effective retirement age 
has averaged about 60 years in Norway. Note that early retirement through these 
arrangements did not reduce future pension benefits at any point in time with the old system, 
neither because of a shorter period of labour market earnings nor through a longer period as 
pensioner. Both disability pensioners and early retirees obtained entitlements as if they 
remained working until the age of 67. 
2.2 Key reform elements  
Except for the rules for accumulation of entitlements, the main elements of the new system 
were implemented from 2011. In addition to the general description of the pension system in 
Christensen et al. (2012) and Fredriksen and Stølen (2014), the new system is described in 
more detail in Fredriksen and Stølen (2011). The new system continues to be a defined benefit 
system financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. The reform is designed to reduce the long run 
                                                          
5 Special tax rules for pension benefits makes the after-tax replacement ratio about 15 percentage points higher than the 
corresponding pre-tax ratio. Income from private pension schemes and special pension schemes for public employees come 
in addition to this figure. 
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growth in future government pension expenditures and to stimulate labour supply, 
maintaining most of the distributional properties of the old system. The most important 
reform elements are: 
1. The pension benefit continues to include two components, a minimum income guarantee 
and an earnings-based benefit. At implementation the minimum benefit was maintained at 
the same level as in the old system. Contrary to the former system, where the special 
supplement was means-tested by 100 percent against the income benefit, the means-testing 
of the guarantee pension is reduced to 80 percent. The new indexation rules imply that the 
guarantee benefit is indexed by wage growth adjusted for growth in life expectancy.  
2. Most of the expenditure risk associated with increases in longevity is shifted from tax 
payers onto each cohort of pensioners through an actuarial mechanism. The new system 
converts the implicit pension wealth of accumulated entitlements into an annuity over the 
average expected remaining lifetime. An increase in the expected number of retirement 
years reduces the annual benefit such that the present value of total pension benefits is 
nearly invariant to changes in current remaining life expectancy and retirement age. This is 
an implementation of what Lindbeck (2006) identifies as an “automatic rule mimicking the 
functioning of actuarially fair private income insurance systems”.6 
3. In the private sector the statutory retirement age and former early retirement arrangements 
were phased out and replaced with a flexible retirement age from the age of 62 years, 
available to everyone who has accumulated enough entitlements to achieve a greater 
pension than the minimum pension. The life expectancy adjustment mechanism described 
in point 2 intends to stimulate labour supply by increasing the individual cost of early 
retirement. If life expectancy increases by one year, an additional eight months of labour 
market participation will be needed to maintain the annual benefit.  
4. Labour supply is also stimulated by a stronger dependency between earnings and old-age 
pension benefits. Both the limits of 40 years to obtain maximum benefits and the “20 best 
years count rule” are abolished. The annual accumulation of entitlements is basically 18.1 
percent of labour incomes below a threshold of approximately 115 percent of average labour 
incomes.  
                                                          
6 However, special rules imply deviations from an exact actuarial adjustment. For instance, the annual benefits and pension 
premium are independent of gender and other observable characteristics correlated with life expectancy. See Stølen (2007) 
for details. 
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5. The income dependent entitlements are indexed by wage growth until retirement. After 
retirement pension benefits in payments are indexed by an average of wages and consumer 
prices.7  
 
Disability pensioners are transferred to old age pensions at the age of 67. By introducing a 
weaker life expectancy adjustment for earlier disabled, the reform may strengthen the 
incentives to retire as a disability pensioner. Our analysis takes the observed rates of transition 
into disability as given.  
     An agreement on the intended inclusion of the early retirement scheme in the new actuarial 
system was obtained for the private sector in the negotiations between the labour market 
organizations in 2008. However, the same agreement has not achieved in the public sector. 
Here, the old early retirement scheme has been preserved between ages 62 and 66, whereas the 
principles from the new actuarial system are implemented from the age of 67 with a guarantee 
that the replacement rate shall not drop below 66 percent for cohorts born up to 1958 retiring at 
that age. Thus, the incentives to delay retirement are weaker for employees in the public 
sector than in the private sector, and the total effect on labour supply will be somewhat 
weaker than predicted by the Norwegian Pension Commission (NOU 2004:1). 
     The cuts in expenditures as a result of the reform are caused by the actuarial life 
expectancy adjustment, and the less generous indexation of benefits in payment. To the extent 
that postponed retirement counteracts the reduction of average annual benefits, the fiscal 
improvement will also be stimulated by increased tax revenues.  
3. Modelling framework 
Our ambition of providing realistic estimates of the total fiscal effects of a fully specified 
pension reform imposes four fundamental requirements: First, accounting for system 
complexity requires an accurate description of most elements in the former and the new 
pension systems. Specifically, one must account for the complex interplay between minimum 
guarantees and earnings-dependent pensions. Second, a detailed description of population 
heterogeneity with respect to age and income is necessary for accurate calculations of 
individual and aggregate pension entitlements and benefits. In particular, the increasing trend 
of female labour supply implies a surge in the future old-age entitlements of women. Third, 
                                                          
7 In practice, the reform implements the less generous indexation in payment as a fixed annual deduction of 0.75 percentage 
points relative to wage indexation. This is consistent with an implicit real wage increase of 1.5 percent.  
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the simulations should take into account that changes in employment affect most non-
petroleum tax bases. The main point of using a CGE model is to clarify and quantify how 
close these tax bases are linked to employment in the business sector. In particular, the CGE 
model is necessary in order to calculate how changes in employment affect the revenues 
collected from indirect and business taxation, which amounted to 36 per cent of the non-
petroleum primary government revenues in 2013. To our knowledge, microsimulation 
analyses of pension reform have not been designed to account for effects on revenues from 
non-personal taxes. Fourth, analyses of fiscal effects of pension reform require a long-run 
perspective, both because they address long run demographic changes and because the 
relevance of many behavioural and equilibrium effects is stronger in the long run. The 
integrated micro-macro model framework used in this paper is designed to meet these 
requirements. Admittedly, it is complex, but a more simple and transparent model framework 
would necessarily produce less realistic estimates. 
3.1 The dynamic microsimulation model 
Tax and pension systems are typically detailed and complex and individuals may face 
different rules. Accordingly, there are substantial aggregation problems when calculating the 
total effect on government budgets of changes in tax or pension systems. Microsimulation 
models overcome these problems; see e.g. Orcutt et al. (1986). The basic idea in 
microsimulation modelling is to represent a socio-economic system by a sample of decision 
units (e.g. persons), and then model the behaviour of these primary units. Contrary to what is 
possible in aggregate models, specifying one or a few representative agents, micro simulation 
models allows an exact description of all details in e.g. the tax and/or the pension system. 
Such models have become increasingly used over the last decades to support governments 
with analyses of tax and pension reforms, as well as other policy changes intended to affect 
the personal incomes of specific groups.  
     The model used in this paper, MOSART, is a dynamic microsimulation model, which has 
been developed over several years at Statistics Norway; see Fredriksen (1998) for 
documentation of an earlier version. MOSART is especially designed to analyse mechanical 
effects on individual pension entitlements, benefits, and government pension expenditures of 
changes in the Norwegian public pension system. The model simulates the life courses for the 
entire Norwegian population. Events, i.e. transitions between states over the life course, 
depend on individual characteristics, and the transition probabilities have been estimated from 
observations in a recent period. MOSART emphasizes events that are relevant for individuals’ 
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accumulation of public pension entitlements, including migration, deaths, births, marriages, 
divorces, educational activities, retirement, and labour force participation. The model includes 
an accurate description of pension rules and captures all relevant heterogeneity of individual 
age-earnings profiles. 
     With the MOSART model it is thus possible to simulate the effect from the pension reform 
on future old-age benefits for every individual. By summing up we obtain the total effect on 
government old-age pension expenditures. Compared to more aggregate analyses, 
microsimulation accounts much more accurately for the heterogeneity of how individuals are 
affected by the reform. Especially this is the case for effects on labour supply further 
discussed below. Total direct effects on labour supply and old-age pension expenditures from 
the microsimulation model are used as exogenous input in the CGE calculations of the effects 
on all tax revenues, and other variables relevant for the complete fiscal effects. The 
microsimulation model also computes reform effects on other government cash transfers to 
households. In particular, we account for changes in the number of disability pensioners and 
their benefits.   
3.2 The CGE Model 
The value-added of using the CGE model in this paper is to provide consistent and detailed 
accounts of the changes in government revenues and expenditures, and how the various 
budget components are affected by changes in employment, old-age pensioners, disability 
pensioners and other beneficiaries of welfare transfers. The model also captures a multitude of 
other variables which affect the government finances, including e.g. population ageing, world 
prices and production of crude oil and natural gas, the return to the financial wealth 
accumulated in the government pension fund, productivity growth, and the quality of tax 
financed services. However, variations in the exogenous assumptions about these variables do 
no basically alter the fiscal effects of a partial pension reform.    
     The CGE model (DEMEC) portrays the Norwegian economy as a standard small open 
economy; see Holmøy and Strøm (2012). All agents face exogenous world prices of exports 
and imports and an exogenous world interest rate. Goods and factors are perfectly mobile 
between industries. All production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. Productivity 
growth is exogenous and labour augmenting in all industries. All markets are perfectly 
competitive and clear in all periods. These assumptions imply that the prices of primary 
production factors are determined by world prices and productivity parameters in the 
industries exposed to competition from foreign producers. Labour is the only primary 
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production factor in the model. Perfect competition implies that producer prices of both traded 
and non-traded goods equal marginal costs, which equal unit cost due to constant returns to 
scale. Consequently, in this long run model relative prices are invariant to changes in 
employment and other variables affected by the pension reform. General equilibrium implies 
that total employment is determined by labour supply, which is exogenous in DEMEC, but 
endogenous in MOSART. A section below explains in detail the labour supply responses to 
the pension reform.  
     The properties of the CGE model imply that aggregate consumption possibilities are 
restricted by employment, productivity growth and a national budget constraint on the 
accumulation of net foreign wealth. We assume that the national financial savings equal the 
central government financial savings. The financial savings of the central government obeys a 
strict interpretation of the fiscal rule introduced in 2001. This rule implies: 1) All the cash 
flow from production of oil and gas collected by the central government are saved in a 
separate sovereign wealth fund called the Government Pension Fund; 2) the non-petroleum 
primary deficit equals the expected real rate of return on the assets. We assume this rate to 
stay constant at 3.5 percent in our simulation period.8 Given the exogenous path of 
government petroleum revenues, these two implications determine directly the time path of 
the government budget constraint.9  
     The model does not capture private savings decisions based on intertemporal optimization. 
The basic assumptions regarding private savings is that the majority of those affected by the 
pension reform postpone retirement in order to keep the annual benefit at the pre-reform level. 
However, for our purposes the main job of the CGE model is to calculate the effect on tax 
bases, especially the bases of all indirect taxes and subsidies, as well as the corporate tax 
bases. Contrary to taxes on labour income and pension benefits, the revenues from indirect 
and corporate taxation cannot be determined without a consistent model of the total economy 
since they depend on the level and composition of the total production. The revenues from 
indirect and business taxation amounted to 36 per cent of the non-petroleum primary 
                                                          
8 The fiscal rule has so far assumed a real rate of return of 4 percent. However, this is widely considered to be too optimistic, 
and more than the observed government spending of the petroleum wealth.  
9 Formally, the fiscal policy rule limits the non-petroleum primary deficit, D, to , where i is the nominal rate 
of return, π is the expected international inflation, and B is the value of the accumulated assets. Net financial investments in 
the fund become , where P is government net petroleum cash flow. Since i, π and P are exogenous 
variables in DEMEC, the time paths of B and D are effectively exogenous. 
( ) 1−−= tt BiD π
tttt PBBB +=− −− 11 π
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government revenues in 2013. Including the payroll tax, this share becomes 54 per cent.10 We 
have given priority to account for the constraints on these tax bases implied by i) the 
government employment share (there are no indirect nor corporate taxes on government 
production), ii) the industry specific production functions, and iii) the net imports consistent 
with long run external balance. Compared to these constraints, changes in the time profile of 
aggregate private consumption, caused by adjustments of individual savings, are likely to be 
of modest importance. 
     We assume that the government budget constraint is met by endogenous pay-as-you-go 
adjustments of a lump-sum tax/transfer. This assumption is of course not made for the sake of 
realism. It is justified for two reasons. First, endogenous lump-sum tax adjustments make the 
pure reform effects most transparent, and these effects are the main issue of this paper. 
Endogenous adjustments of other tax rates would affect tax bases and government 
expenditures through equilibrium effects on relative prices. These effects would be hard to 
distinguish from the pure pension reform effects. Second, any selection of endogenous tax 
rates would be somewhat arbitrary, and we would risk that our analyses would stimulate 
discussions about tax reforms rather than the pension reform. 
 
Table 1. Key macroeconomic assumptions. Average annual growth rates unless 
otherwise indicated. Percent. 
Labour productivity growth in private industries 2.0 
Output expanding labour productivity growth in all government sectors 0.5 
Additional growth in the standard of hospital services and long-term care  0.5 
Nominal interest rate, level, percent 5.5 
Outtake from GPF, level, percent (from 2020) 3.5 
World prices 2.0 
Real price of crude oil, 2015-$, level 64 $ 
Source: Authors’ assumptions. 
                                                          
10 Holmøy and Strøm (2017) discuss analytically and empirically how standard CGE models can be 
used to calculate effects on the revenues from indirect taxes and business taxes. 
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3.3 Key Assumptions  
The projections of pension entitlements and benefits are based on detailed information for the 
entire Norwegian population up to 2010 and adjustments based on aggregate observations up 
to 2013. Most transition probabilities in MOSART are based on observed averages from 2008 
to 2012. The CGE model is calibrated to the National Accounts of 2010, and the course of the 
main macroeconomic aggregates are in line with observations till 2013. 
     The demographic projections are taken from the official projections, see Statistics Norway 
(2014) and Tønnessen, Syse and Aase (2014). Statistics Norway considers the medium 
alternatives with respect to assumptions on fertility, mortality and migration to be most 
realistic. These assumptions imply that the number of those aged 20-66 divided by the number 
of those 67 and older decrease from 4.8 in 2010 to 2.5 in 2060. The baby boom after World 
War II contributes to the strong decrease in this ratio in the nearest decades, whereas 
increased longevity drives the long run reduction. From 2013 till 2060 the life expectancy of 
new-borns increases by 6.9 years for men and 5.6 years for women. For the effects of the 
pension reform, the conditional remaining expected life expectancy at the age 62 is 
particularly relevant. From 2013 till 2060 the increases for men and women are, respectively, 
5.7 and 4.3 years. The increase in the old-age dependency ratio is somewhat mitigated by 
immigration, which has been much higher after 2004 than in earlier years.  
     Except from effects caused by the pension reform, we assume that both average future 
participation rates and working hours remain at their present levels in all population groups 
defined by gender, age and education. An increase in the average education levels contributes 
to a modest growth in participation and working hours over the simulation period. Except for 
the public old age pension system, the present welfare schemes, including wage indexation of 
most welfare transfers, are prolonged in all scenarios. Resources used in sectors producing 
public goods remain constant at present per capita levels. For tax financed production of 
individual services (child care, education, health services, and long-term care) we prolong the 
most recent observations of the gender and age specific ratios of users per capita, whereas the 
corresponding service standards (= resources per user) are raised by 1 percent per year. The 
development of the world prices and production of crude oil and natural gas, as well as the 
government petroleum revenues are in line with the assumptions in the “Perspectives report 
2013” (Ministry of Finance, 2013). The decline in these revenues is assumed to be relatively 
strong over the next decades as the most profitable oil and gas resources are depleted. This 
implies a gradual slowdown of the 4 percent annual outtake from the Government Pension 
Fund. Table 1 summarizes other key macroeconomic assumptions. As noted above, 
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government finances depend crucially on these assumptions, especially on those which 
determine the demographic dependency ratio, government petroleum revenues and the return 
to the savings in the Government Pension Fund, the standard of health services, long-term 
care and other tax financed services. However, although changes in these assumptions affect 
the fiscal motivation for pension reform, the partial fiscal effects of the reform is not basically 
altered by fiscal stance in the non-reform scenario. The key implications of the exogenous 
assumptions are explained below in a separate section on the non-reform scenario.         
4. Employment effects 
Three kinds of employment effects may be expected as a consequence of the reform: 
1. Effects on working hours prior to retirement age caused by a closer connection 
between pension entitlements and former earnings with the new system 
2. Immediate effects on retirement 
3. Postponed retirement when life expectancy increases 
4.1 Effects on working-hours 
Changes in the system of accrual of pension entitlements create a closer connection between 
pension entitlements and former earnings with the new system. 
• The rule making entitlements dependent on the 20 years with highest labour incomes 
is abolished. 
• While 40 years of accumulation were necessary to achieve full pensions with the old 
system, labour incomes for more than 40 years may increase entitlements with the 
new. 
• While yearly incomes smaller than 1 BPU (Basic Pension Unit, equal to 1/6 of average 
annual labour incomes) do not produce any extra entitlements with the old model of 
accumulation, even small incomes count with the new system. 
• With the old system incomes between 6 BPU (equal to average annual labour 
incomes) and 12 BPU only produced 1/3 of full entitlements. With the new system full 
entitlements are accumulated up to yearly incomes of 7.1 BPU. Far more persons are 
in the interval 6 to 7.1 BPU than above. 
• With the old system the special supplement for persons with low pension entitlements 
is means-tested with 100 percent against income pensions. With the new system the 
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means-testing of the guarantee pension against income pensions is reduced to 80 
percent. 
Stensnes (2007) estimated the labour supply incentives at the intensive margin in the old and 
the new system. According to his estimates the reform implies that 1 NOK extra labour 
market earnings raises the present value of future pension benefits from 0.101 NOK to 0.157 
NOK, on average. This corresponds to a 5.1 percent increase in the perceived effective wage 
rate. We consider this estimate as cautious, because it does not take into account that 
individual income dependency becomes more transparent and more similar between 
individuals in the new system. With a compensated labour supply elasticity of 0.5, the shift to 
the new pension system increases working hours prior to retirement by 2.5 percent.  
4.2 Effects on retirement  
Several studies find that labour supply is more elastic on the extensive than on the intensive 
margin, see e.g. Heckman (1993), Gruber and Wise (2004), Chan and Stevens (2003) and 
Immervoll et al. (2007).11 Through microsimulation we also account for heterogeneous 
retirement behaviour. One example is that individuals with high level of education will retire 
later than those with low education.  
     In the first econometric study of the effects of the Norwegian pension reform on retirement, 
also Hernæs et al. (2016) find that the reform has a significant positive immediate effect on 
labour supply for 63-years old workers in the private sector with access to the former early 
retirement scheme. The analysis compares the 1946-1947 birth cohorts, who reached 63 years in 
the two years prior to the reform in 2010-2011, with the 1949 cohort who reached 63 in 2012. 
The results are in accordance with previous analyses by Hernæs and Jia (2013) and Brinch et al. 
(2013) of the effects from the stepwise removal of the earnings test in the Norwegian public 
pension system for ages 67-69 over the period 2008-2010.  
     In their analyses Hernæs et al. exploit that different groups of employees are affected in 
completely different ways by the reform. They divide the employees in three main groups: 
i) Employees in the public sector who all have access to the former early retirement 
scheme (AFP) 
ii) Employees in the private sector with access to AFP 
iii) Employees in the private sector with no access to AFP, including self employed 
                                                          
11 On the other hand, Samwick (1998) finds that levels of pension and other wealth are not major determinants of retirement. 
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Each of the three groups are further divided into two sub-groups dependent on whether the 
actual persons after the reform have accumulated enough entitlements to withdraw pensions at 
age 62 or not. Below the age of 67 withdrawal of pensions (and thereby retirement in reality) is 
not allowed if calculated old-age pensions are smaller than the minimum pension in the 
National Insurance System. In the private sector some persons entitled to AFP lost their right to 
retire early as a consequence of the reform because they have not accumulated enough 
entitlements at age 62. Hernæs et al. find a significant increase in employment and labour 
market earnings at age 63 for this group. This is also the case for the main group of employees 
with AFP in private sector with enough entitlements to withdraw pensions at age 62. For this 
group the new system means a complete removal of the confiscatory earnings test with the old 
system, implying a cut in AFP-pensions corresponding to labour earnings.      
     Because the old system for AFP is maintained in the public sector, the reform implies no 
changes in either access age or work incentives between age 62 and 67. However, Hernæs et al. 
(2016) find a small significant effect on employment and labour earnings for persons in this 
group with enough entitlements to obtain social security pensions at age 62. Their interpretation 
of the finding is that some employees find it more attractive to continue in employment because 
it is also possible for employees in the public sector to combine employment with early pay-out 
from the social security pension. Employees in the private sector with no access to AFP, but 
with enough entitlements to retire at age 62, experience a reduction in access age as a result of 
the reform. Hernæs et al. (2016) find that this group has a small, but significant, reduction in 
their employment and labour earnings as a result of the reform. 
     Although estimated parameters from empirical analyses like Hernæs et al. are taken into 
account in the implementation of transition probabilities in MOSART, it is difficult to establish 
a direct link. Transition probabilities for retirement are dependent on age, gender and by cohort 
via level of education and former earnings. The recent empirical results are quite in accordance 
with earlier assumptions of the effects implemented in the model. As a simplified illustration for 
the short term effects on retirement a couple of years after the reform, the total effect may be 
constructed by weighing together plausible effects for the three main groups mention above. 
     For about 30 per cent of the employees in the private sector entitled to the early retirement 
scheme Fredriksen and Stølen (2007) assumed that they would delay retirement by 1.2 years as 
an immediate effect of the reform. This is in accordance with Brinch et al. (2001) who 
estimated that a hypothetical switch from the retirement incentives in the old system to those 
implied by a perfectly actuarial system, would delay retirement by 2.4 years on average. An 
assumed effect of only one half of this implies that participation rates for the age groups 62-
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66 as an immediate effect of the reform could increase to about the average of the rates 
observed in 2010 and those observed in the early 1980s, when no early retirement schemes 
had been introduced. For about the 30 per cent of the employees in the public sector the direct 
effect on participation rates for the group 62-66 obviously could expected to be small when it 
was decided to maintain the old early retirement scheme. Because the reform implied a 
reduction of the minimum retirement age from 67 to 62 for the about 40 per cent of the 
employees in the private sector not entitled to the earlier retirement scheme, the empirical 
results by Hernæs et al. (2016) are quite in accordance with the earlier assumptions that the 
reform could reduce average retirement for this group by 0.3 years. An average immediate 
effect on retirement age, i.e. neglecting effects of increased life expectancy, may then be 
weighted to: 0.3 * 1.2 years + 0.3 * 0 years + 0.4 *(-0.3 years) = 0.24 years. This is somewhat 
lower than assumed in earlier analyses, e.g. Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) based on the 
assumption that the early retirement scheme in the public sector would be incorporated in the 
new system.  
     Increasing life expectancy was likely to have only a negligible effect on retirement with the 
old system, since the annual benefit was independent of the number of years as a pensioner. 
With the new actuarial system increased life expectancy is likely to increase the retirement 
age through consumption smoothing, see e.g. Bloom, Canning and Moore (2004). The 
optimal response is then to trade some of the leisure increment for consumption, and 
postponing retirement is a probable response.  
     A relative long period of observations after the reform is necessary to make empirical 
analyses of the effects from increased longevity on retirement age.  About 40 percent of the 
individuals will be unaffected by the changes in the early retirement incentives, since they are 
disabled before the age of 62. Earlier disabled will be transferred to old age pensions at the 
age of 67. Disabled individuals cannot counteract the negative benefit effect of the life 
expectancy adjustment by extending their working career. The government has found it fair 
that the earlier disabled to some extent should be protected from the default life expectancy 
adjustment mechanism with the new system; the benefit cut implied by this mechanism is 
therefore reduced by 50 percent for the former disabled old-aged pensioners.  
     Also when estimating possible effects from increased longevity on average retirement age, 
it is relevant to take into account that different groups may be affected differently. For those 
who work until they become old-age pensioners, we assume that 20 percent is so healthy that 
their delay of retirement equals the increase in life expectancy. For the remaining share of 50 
percent working in the private sector Fredriksen and Stølen (2007) and Holmøy and Stensnes 
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(2008) assumed a delay of retirement equal to 2/3 of the increase in life expectancy. This 
response neutralizes the benefit cut caused by the life expectancy adjustment mechanism. 
While assuming a minor response for the 30 per cent working in the public sector, in sum 
these responses implies a 0.5 years delay of retirement for each year life expectancy increases 
(0.5 * 2/3 + 0.2 * 1 + 0.3 * 0 = 0.5). Because of the preservation of the old early retirement 
system in the public sector, also this estimate is reduced compared to earlier analyses.  
4.3 Total employment effects 
From 2013 to 2060 the average conditional remaining life expectancy for men and women of 
62 years is expected to increase by about 5 years from 22.8 to 27.6 years. Adding the 
immediate reform effect on retirement of 0.24 years and the effect which increases with 
remaining life expectancy, implies that the average reform effect in 2060 equals 0.24 + 0.5*5 
= 2.74 years for those who are not disabled at the age of 62. Also taking into account the 
positive effect on participation rate for persons younger than 62, we estimate the direct reform 
effect on the labour force in 2060 to 185 000 persons, or 5.5 percent. Including the effect on 
average working hours at the intensive margin gives a total effect on man-hours in 2060 of 7.1 
percent compared to the no-reform scenario.  
5. Fiscal effects 
We measure the fiscal effect by a normalized fiscal gap, defined as the deviation between the 
simulated government budget deficit and the deficit consistent with the fiscal rule. This gap is 
measured in current prices, and hard to interpret unless it is normalized. We normalize the gap 
by calculating its share of the simulated path for the current value of GDP for the mainland 
sector of the Norwegian economy, hereafter called GDP-M.12 This normalized fiscal gap has 
proved to be the most frequently used indicator of the fiscal stance in the Norwegian policy 
debate.  
5.1 A no-reform baseline scenario 
Figure 1 shows the projected normalized fiscal gap in the no-reform and the reform scenario. 
In all but the first three years after the implementation of the new system, the two gap 
scenarios are basically identical until 2020. In this period the fiscal rule allows successive cuts 
                                                          
12GDP for the mainland economy equals total GDP minus value added in the sectors Ocean Transport and Production of Crude Oil and 
Natural Gas.  
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in tax rates and/or increases in government spending under our assumptions. In 2020 the 
possible reduction in government net revenues would amount to 3.6 percent of the projected 
mainland GDP in this year, if the old pension system were maintained. However, after 2020 
the no-reform scenario shows a continuous need for reversing the decrease in government net 
revenues. After 2035 the fiscal gap becomes positive, passing 8.7 percent of the projected 
mainland GDP in 2060.  
     There are two key forces behind this fiscal gap dynamics. First, the adverse fiscal effect of 
ageing becomes significantly stronger when the growth in the population share of individuals 
of age 80 or more accelerates after 2020, since the use of tax financed health- and long-term 
care services is much higher for this group than for others. Second, the inflow of government 
petroleum revenues to the Government Pension Fund diminishes over the next 20 years, 
which causes a slowdown of the 4 percent annual outtake from the fund. 
  
 
Figure 1. Simulated fiscal gap with the old and the new public pension system, 2010-2060. 
Percent of GDP for the mainland economy.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models  
 
     The no-reform scenario motivates the question: Does Norway need pension reform or 
other welfare reforms in order to avoid severe fiscal sustainability problems? Figure 1 may 
justify both a “no” and a “yes” to this question. A “no” can be justified by considering the 
level of the fiscal gap, which is negative in all years until 2035. Simultaneously, the fiscal 
policy rule implies an unprecedented accumulation of financial assets. Thus, judged by the 
levels of government expenditures and tax bases within a 20-30 years perspective, Norway’s 
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fiscal future looks bright. In particular, it looks much brighter than it did when the pension 
reform process was initiated. Then the real oil price was expected to average less than half of 
the level assumed in this paper. 
     On the other hand, Figure 1 also serves as a fiscal motivation for the pension reform if one 
emphasizes the growth trends after 2020 rather than the levels of government revenues and 
expenditures in a more or less arbitrarily selected year. Stronger growth in government 
expenditures than in the tax base after 2020 will eventually undermine the impressive 
government finances. Sooner or later sustainable government finances require alignment of 
the growth rates of, respectively, government expenditures and the tax bases. If taxes were cut 
until 2020 according to Figure 1, unpopular reversals of these cuts would be necessary all 
subsequent years. No available information suggests that the necessary tax burden would 
stabilize if the simulation period were extended beyond 2060. One may also criticize both 
scenarios underlying Figure 1 for underrating the future tax burden. First, they assume 
prolongation of the present levels of the average working hours despite real growth in 
consumption possibilities per capita, which implies a break with long run historical trends. 
Second, assuming 0.5 percent annual growth in man hours per users of hospital services and 
long-term care, and no such standard improvements in other individual tax financed services, 
is cautious compared with historical trends. Many projections of government spending on 
health services and long-term care assume an income elasticity of health services equal to or 
greater than unity, see e.g. Acemoglu, Finkelstein and Notowidigdo (2013) and OECD 
(2013b). The assumptions in the no-reform scenario imply that growing public pension 
expenditures is the dominant source behind the gap in growth rates of government revenues 
and expenditures after 2020. The public pension expenditures grow from 6.7 to 12.8 percent 
of GDP-M from 2014 to 2060. 
     The most important reason for the rise in the GDP-M share of public pension expenditures 
with the old system is that this system does not include any actuarial adjustment mechanism 
which modifies the effect of the increase in longevity, which averages 4.8 years for 
individuals aged 62 years in the period 2013-2060 in this scenario. In addition, the large 
cohorts born after World War II will replace less populous mid-war cohorts. Moreover, public 
pension benefits in payment are assumed to be indexed to wage growth with the old system, 
and the wage rate grows faster than the GDP deflator. Also, maturing of the existing pension 
system, as well as growth in female labour market earnings, contributes to raise the average 
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annual public old age benefit. Deflated by the wage rate, this benefit is 3.4 percent higher in 
2060 than in 2014.13 
 
Table 2. Fiscal effects of the pension reform. Deviations between the share of 
government budget components in mainland GDP (GDP-M) in the reform scenario and 
the no-reform scenario (base). Percentage points. 
 2020 2040 2060 
Primary revenues 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 0.0 0.2 0.3 
  Direct taxes from households 0.3 0.0 -0.2 
  Social security taxes -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
  Other revenues -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Primary expenditures -0.8 -4.3 -6.5 
  Transfers to households -0.1 -2.5 -3.8 
     Public old-age pensions -0.2 -2.3 -3.4 
  Government consumption -0.6 -1.6 -2.3 
  Other expenditures 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 
Primary deficit 0.9 4.1 6.3 
  Net returns to financial wealth -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
5.2 Reform effects 
Figure 1 shows that the pension reform is likely to reduce the growth in the fiscal gap 
significantly after 2020. The model simulations suggest that the period where the fiscal gap 
declines is extended from 2020 to 2025. With the new system the rising normalized fiscal gap 
passes zero from below in 2050, and 2.8 percent in 2060, which is 5.9 percentage points lower 
than in the no-reform scenario. The slight increase in the fiscal gap in the first four years after 
the implementation of the reform is due to an increase in early withdrawal of old-age pension 
benefits. Recall that the new system offers a high degree of flexibility with respect to 
withdrawal of benefits for employees in the private sector, who may combine work and 
                                                          
13This average growth in the annual wage deflated old-age pension benefit conceals a great difference between Norwegian 
residents and non-residents. For residents this benefit is 13.6 percent higher in 2060 compared with the 2014-level. For non-
residents the benefit is 8.8 percent lower in 2060 than in 2014.  
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pension after the age of 62. Increased early withdrawal reduces, cet. par, public pension 
expenditures in later years. Section 6.3 discusses the importance of changes in the benefit 
withdrawal behaviour. 
     Table 2 shows that the main contributions to the reduction of the normalized fiscal gap 
come from the fall in the GDP shares of the government expenditures. In 2060 reform reduces 
the GDP-M share of primary expenditures by 6.5 percentage points from 58.6 to 52.1 percent. 
The main source of this is the fall in the GDP-M share of public old-age pensions from 12.8 
percent without reform to 9.4 percent in the reform scenario.  
     The negative reform effect on the GDP-M share of government consumption is solely 
caused by the increase in GDP-M resulting from the reform effect on employment. By 
assumption, government consumption is identical in both scenarios. The small effects on the 
GDP-M shares of the tax revenues reflect that the corresponding tax bases are very closely 
related to GDP-M. Thus, the reform effect on employment and GDP-M implies that important 
fiscal effects are obscured when measured in terms of changes in GDP-M ratios.  
 
 
Figure 2. Effects of the pension reform. Deviations between the reform scenario and the no-
reform scenario (base). Percent.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
     Figure 2 shows the time path of the key fiscal effects measured in terms of percentage 
deviation between the two scenarios. Table 3 provides more details on the relative fiscal 
effects in 2060, as well as the corresponding absolute deviations between the present values of 
the budget components measured in 2014-prices. The present values are computed by 
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discounting the variables measured in current prices by a nominal discount rate of 4 percent. 
This discount rate equals the growth rate of the average nominal wage rate. Thus, the present 
values may alternatively be interpreted as current values deflated by the nominal wage growth 
rate.  
 
Table 3. Fiscal effects of the pension reform in 2060 with the old system as base. 
Percentage deviations and discounted absolute deviations in billions 2010-NOK.  
 Percentage 
deviations 
Discounted absolute deviations, 
billion 2014-NOK 
Primary revenues 8.1 106.9 
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 11.3 43.5 
  Direct taxes from households 7.2 30.9 
  Social security taxes 5.5 20.9 
  Other revenues 1.8 11.7 
Primary expenditures -3.5 -61.7 
  Transfers to households -8.1 -59.7 
    Public old-age pensions -20.5 -78.6 
  Government consumption 0.0 0.0 
  Other expenditures -1.4 -1.9 
Memo   
Employment 7.1  
GDP, Mainland 8.4  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
     Among the items listed in Table 3 the reduction in public old-age pension expenditures 
makes the strongest contribution to the improvement of government finances, both in relative 
and absolute terms. Compared with the no-reform scenario in 2060, these expenditures fall by 
20.5 percent. Discounted back to 2014, this amounts to 78.6 billion 2014-NOK. However, 
public old-age pension expenditures will grow strongly over time also with the new system in 
place. Deflated by the average wage rate, these expenditures will pass 2.2 times the 2010-
level in 2060. The basic reasons are the growth in the number of pensioners and the average 
entitlements for female workers.  
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     The negative reform effect on the public old-age pension expenditures is somewhat 
modified by an increase in other government cash transfers to households. The reason is that 
the increase in the number of relatively old employees caused by delayed retirement is 
mitigated by an increase in the number of recipients of disability benefits, unemployment 
benefits and sickness benefits. Compared with the no-reform scenario in 2060 the increases in 
these transfers add to 18.8 billion 2014-NOK, which brings the reduction of total cash 
transfers to household down to 59.7 billion 2014-NOK, i.e. 8.1 percent.  
     Interestingly, the positive revenue effect due to tax base expansion dominates the reduction 
in government expenditures. In present value terms the reform implies that the primary 
revenues in 2060 are 96.5 billion 2014-NOK (corresponding to 8.1 percent) higher than in the 
no-reform scenario. The corresponding fall in the present value of primary expenditures 
equals 61.7 billion 2014-NOK (3.5 percent). This demonstrates the importance of the labour 
supply responses, the assumption that all additional labour supply becomes employed without 
any drop in the real wage rate, and the assumption that all the additional employment is 
absorbed by the private sector. Moreover, the equilibrium adjustments of the various tax bases 
demonstrate the empirical significance of taking properly account of the fact that increased 
employment in the private sector raise almost all tax bases in the mainland economy.  
6. Sensitivity analyses 
We examine the robustness of the fiscal effects of the reform to variations in 1) longevity; 2) 
retirement behaviour; 3) benefit withdrawal behaviour; 4) life expectancy adjustments for 
earlier disabled. This selection is motivated by what have been topical issues in the 
Norwegian pension debate, as well as insights from relevant recent studies specified below. 
This section focuses on the reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap. Appendix 2 presents 
results for some other relevant variables.  
6.1 Longevity 
For decades, the observed decline in mortality among the elderly in Norway has proved hard 
to predict. As explained above, a main intention of the new system is to make public pension 
expenditures less dependent on changes in longevity. The basic mechanism is the actuarial 
life expectancy adjustment, which, cet. par. reduces the annual benefits when life expectancy 
increases. Delayed retirement counteracts this effect by raising entitlements and reducing the 
number of pension years, provided that the timing of benefit withdrawals follows the 
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retirement adjustments. Below we provide a more focused examination of the empirical 
importance of these actuarial mechanisms by re-simulating both the baseline and reform 
scenarios under three different assumptions on average longevity. We compare the most 
plausible Medium (longevity growth) alternative, presented in Section 5, with two alternatives. 
Whereas life expectancy for new-borns increases by 6.9 years for men and by 5.6 years for 
women from 2013 till 2060 in the Medium alternative, the corresponding increments are -0.2 
and 1.8 years, respectively, in the Low (longevity growth) alternative. The corresponding 
increments in the High (longevity growth) alternative are, respectively, 11.5 and 10.2 years.  
     Figure 3 confirms that the reform effect on the normalized fiscal gap becomes stronger the 
higher is the longevity growth. Whereas medium longevity growth implies that the reform 
reduces the normalized fiscal gap by 5.9 percentage points in 2060, the corresponding effects 
are 3.1 and 8.8 points in, respectively, the low and high longevity growth scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap under three different assumptions on 
longevity growth (High, Medium, Low). Absolute deviations between the new system and the 
old system (base). Percentage points. 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
     The reform effect on both government revenues and expenditures become stronger the 
more longevity increases, see Appendix 2, Table A2.1. Due to the incentives in the new 
system, the reform raises employment by 7.1 percent in 2060 (185 000 persons) in the 
Medium alternative. The corresponding effects in the High and Low growth alternatives are, 
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respectively, 9.3 percent (260 000) and 4.7 percent (108 000). The employment effects are 
nearly perfectly correlated with the corresponding effects on the tax bases. 
     The expenditure reductions are driven by the reform effect on the public pension 
expenditures. In 2060 the reform reduces these expenditures by 20.5 percent in the case of 
medium longevity growth, by 26.2 percent in the high growth alternative, and by 9.9 percent 
in the case of low longevity growth; see Table A2.1 and Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2. 
Variations in longevity have a much smaller effect on the old age pension expenditures in the 
new system than in the old one, see Appendix 2, Figure A2.2. What remains of this effect in 
the new system reflects foremost that the life expectancy adjustment of old-age benefits is 
more lenient for those who are disabled before they become old-age pensioners.  
     We conclude that the reform is indeed likely to work as intended: The life expectancy 
adjustment built into the new system neutralizes most of the direct effect on old-age pension 
expenditures caused by changes in life expectancy, whereas the old system did not have any 
such moderating mechanism. Moreover, combined with the stronger link between earnings 
and entitlements, this life expectancy mechanism will expand employment and tax bases 
when longevity increases.  
6.2 Employment responses to new incentives 
Labour supply behaviour is uncertain in general, and the empirical basis of estimating long 
run behavioural effects of a specific pension reform, implemented as late as 2011, will 
necessarily remain weak for several years. Moreover, it is uncertain to what extent the 
additional labour supply from individuals aged 60 years or more actually will be employed. 
Below, we compare the most plausible reform effects laid out in Section 4 and 5 with the 
corresponding effects resulting from two more extreme assumptions about retirement 
responses. In the No delay alternative we assume that the propensities for retirement are 
almost unaffected by the reform. In the Max delay alternative workers delay retirement as in 
the medium alternative, but the propensities to enter disability by age are also reduced 
corresponding to 2/3 of the growth in life expectancy, as a result of improved health among 
the elderly.  
     The reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap are quite sensitive to retirement behaviour, 
see Figure 4. In 2060 the reform reduces the normalized fiscal gap by 5.9 percentage points in 
the Medium delay alternative, 2.7 points in the No delay alternative, and by 7.9 points in the 
Max delay alternative. This sensitivity is dominated by the close relationship between 
employment and most tax bases in the Norwegian mainland economy. The reform effects on 
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employment in 2060 are 7.1 and 11.1 percent in the Medium and the Max delay alternatives, 
respectively, whereas employment falls by 0.6 percent in the No delay alternative, see 
Appendix 2, Table A2.2.  On the other hand, the actuarial mechanisms in the new system 
make government pension expenditures rather insensitive to the retirement behaviour; the 
expenditure effect of a decline in the number of old age pensioners caused by delayed 
retirement is nearly neutralized by the increase in the average annual benefit, see Appendix 2, 
figures A2.3 and A2.4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap under three different assumptions about 
delay of retirement in the new system. Absolute deviations between the new system and the 
old system (base). Percentage points.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
6.3 Benefit withdrawal behaviour 
The new public pension system allows employees in the private sector to combine work and 
pension from the age of 62 in a rather flexible way, provided sufficient entitlements. 
Advancing withdrawal changes the time profile of the individual benefits for the average 
person, but not the expected present value of the benefit flow for the average person. 
However, combining early withdrawal with work may be beneficial for persons with shorter 
remaining life expectancy than the average person in a given cohort. It may also be beneficial 
for individuals with expected pensions slightly above the minimum pension due to very 
favourable tax allowances. In 2012 almost 45 percent of those who were entitled had 
withdrawn old age pensions before the age of 67, and about 2/3 of old age pensioners below 
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the age of 67 had chosen to work in combination with withdrawing pensions; see Dahl and 
Lien (2013). These shares are far higher than expected before the reform.  
     The most plausible projection, presented in Section 5, relies on the assumption of a 
Medium degree of early withdrawal: those who obtain some tax allowances withdraw benefits 
early in combination with continued work. In a Maximum early withdrawal alternative we 
assume that all persons in the private sector of age 63 years or more, with sufficient 
entitlements, withdraw pensions in addition to labour incomes. We also study a No early 
withdrawal alternative. 
     Of course, advancing withdrawal of benefits raises, cet. par., the public old-age pension 
expenditures in the first decades. We find the greatest impact of withdrawal on these 
expenditures in 2014, where they are 17 billion 2014-NOK (10 percent) higher in the Medium 
alternative than in the No early withdrawal alternative, see Appendix 2, Figure A2.6. In the 
Maximum early withdrawal alternative these expenditures would have increased further by 6 
billion NOK, or 3.8 percentage points. However, we see no reason why changes in 
withdrawal behaviour should affect other public budget components than the old-age pension 
expenditures, net of taxes. Although early withdrawal means lower annual benefits for the 
recipient over the entire remaining life time, additional expenditures in the first decades does 
not imply lower expenditures in the long run. All reform effects are approximately invariant 
to the withdrawal behaviour after 2040, see Table A2.3 and the Figures A2.5- A2.7 in 
Appendix 2. First, births and immigration imply a nearly constant number of persons entering 
the group of old-age pensioners during a year. Second, the actuarial properties of the new 
system neutralize the effect of increased longevity on the balance between young and old old-
age pensioners.  
6.4 Life expectancy adjustments for former disabled 
An unsettled reform issue is how the life expectancy adjustment should work for those who 
are disability pensioners before they are transferred to the public old-age pension scheme at 
the age of 67. So far the adjustment for this group has been half as strong as the adjustment 
applying for former employees. We will refer to this practice as “Half protection”. The 
argument for such a protection of disabled is that earlier disabled cannot counteract life 
expectancy adjustments by delaying retirement. This concern should be balanced against 
concerns about the economic incentives to retire early through disability insurance. This 
trade-off is discussed in e.g. Börsch-Supan, Hank and Jürges (2005) and Galaasen (2014a). 
We compare Half protection with two extreme alternatives: 1) No protection, i.e. the same life 
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expectancy adjustment for all, and 2) Full protection, i.e. no life expectancy adjustment for 
former disabled.  
     Variations in this kind of protection affect two government budget components only: old-
age pension expenditures and taxes collected from pensioners. The fiscal effects grow 
relatively slowly over time from negligible magnitudes in the first couple of decades; see 
Appendix 2, Table A2.4 and the Figures A2.8 – A2.10. This reflects gradual phasing out of a 
general lenient practice of life expectancy adjustment, as well as longevity growth. The 
effects are still relatively small in 2060: Full protection raises the normalized fiscal gap by 0.4 
percentage points from the Half protection scenario. Going from Half to No protection 
reduces this gap by 0.3 points. In 2060 “half protection” causes old-age pension expenditures 
to be 11 billion NOK, or 3.8 percent higher than in the case of no protection. Full protection 
would have increased the expenditures further with about 13 billion NOK.  
7. Conclusions 
Estimates of pension reform effects typically belong to one of three strands of the literature: 
(1) Highly detailed dynamic microsimulation of purely mechanical effects on individual 
benefits and government pension expenditures; (2) Econometric studies of behavioural effects 
of particular elements of pension system, especially labour supply; (3) CGE estimates of the 
long run effects of rather stylized reforms on employment, fiscal sustainability and the inter-
generational welfare distribution. This paper integrates these approaches in order to evaluate 
to what extent the Norwegian pension reform of 2011 is likely to reach its main goal, which is 
to contribute substantially to improve long run fiscal sustainability without large cuts in the 
public old-age pension benefits. We combine detailed dynamic microsimulation with a 
consistent CGE model of the total economy, including all government revenues and 
expenditures, and we exploit the available econometric evidence on presumptive important 
behavioural adjustments.  
     Our simulations show that it is harder to motivate cost saving reforms of public welfare 
schemes in Norway than in most other countries. Until about 2035 it would be feasible to 
finance the old pension system and the other existent welfare schemes at tax rates lower than 
the present ones, without violating the present policy rule for saving the government 
petroleum revenues. However, Norway faces a fundamental fiscal sustainability problem in 
the long run since government expenditures will grow significantly faster than the tax base 
after 2020. This growth in the fiscal gap is basically a result of the combination of ageing and 
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generous welfare schemes. The Norwegian pension reform is tailored to reduce the growth in 
the fiscal gap by mitigating the long run growth in the pension expenditures and by raising tax 
bases through stronger labour supply incentives, rather than being immediately cost saving. 
The key reform element in this respect is a more actuarial adjustment of the annual old age 
benefit to changes in life expectancy and early retirement. 
     Our results, summarized in Table 4, suggest that the reform is indeed likely to make a great 
impact in the intended direction. Maintaining the old system would imply an increase in the 
share of the public old-age pension expenditures in GDP-M from 7.6 to 12.8 percent, from 
2020 till 2060. With the new system the corresponding rise is reduced to 2 percentage points. 
The GDP-M share of the fiscal gap will be significantly negative in most years in the period 
2013-2060 in the most plausible reform scenario, but it will still rise from -4.5 percent around 
2025 to nearly 3 percent in 2060. Thus, the pension reform alone is far from sufficient to 
eliminate the Norwegians long run problem of fiscal sustainability. This is no surprise; the 
pension reform is not intended to curb the growth in government spending on health services 
and long-term care. On the other hand, the fiscal prospects would look much more worrying if 
the old system were maintained. In this scenario the normalized fiscal gap increases from -3.5 
percent around 2020 to nearly 9 percent in 2060.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of key variables in 2060 based on the most plausible assumptions. All 
variables except the employment share are measured in percent of GDP of the mainland 
economy. Percent.  
 
2013 2020 2060 
Observed No-reform Reform No-reform Reform 
Fiscal gap 0.0 -3.6 -4.4 8.7 2.8 
Government primary 
expenditures 
49.8 49.0 48.2 58.6 52.1 
Public old-age pension 
expenditures 
6.3 7.6 7.4 12.8 9.4 
Man years (1620 hours) per 
capita 
0.46 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.45 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
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     The lion share of the negative reform effect on government expenditures and the fiscal gap 
comes from delayed retirement, which reduces the number of old-age pensioners and raises 
employment in the private sector, and thereby most non-petroleum tax bases. Prolongation of 
the old system would reduce man years (= 1620 man hours) per capita from the present 0.46 
to 0.42 in 2060. The pension reform raises this ratio to 0.45 in 2060. In 2060 employment is 
7.1 percent higher in the reform scenario than in the no-reform scenario. We regard this as a 
strong effect. Our results demonstrate that one would seriously underestimate the fiscal effects 
of the pension reform if behavioural effects and equilibrium effects on tax bases were ignored. 
Moreover, the employment effect of the reform implies that most of the reductions in public 
old-age pension expenditures results from a decrease in the number of recipients rather than 
lower benefits.  
     Larger longevity increases and stronger labour supply responses strengthen the positive 
fiscal reform effects. This sensitivity of mortality and labour supply responses is caused by 
the actuarial life expectancy mechanism in the new system. No such mechanism existed in the 
old system. The combination of this mechanism and increasing longevity is also the basic 
reason why the reform effects grow over time. Our assessed reform effects are quite robust 
with respect to realistic variations in benefit withdrawal behaviour, as well as variations in the 
life expectancy mechanism applying to those who are disabled before they become old-age 
pensioners.  
     This study leaves several topical issues for future research. First, it would be interesting to 
assess the social efficiency effects of the reform. Since the effective tax rates on labour 
income are large in Norway, the strong positive reform effect on employment is likely to 
entail a significant social efficiency gain. This gain may be compared with the distributional 
effects assessed in Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) and Christensen et al. (2012). Second, it 
would be interesting to estimate the effects of extending the reform to cover employees in the 
public sector, especially because population ageing is likely to raise the employment share of 
the public sector. Third, one should examine more carefully our use of the standard 
assumption that firms will be willing to employ any increase in the labour supply from old 
individuals, without any changes in real wage rates or other conditions.  
     Although the use of large empirical models in this paper has given priority to realism and 
gone a long way to account for all available information relevant for the policy evaluation, 
there is obvious scope for methodological improvements. Specifically, consistency can be 
improved by merging the most important aspects of individual life courses and the general 
equilibrium mechanisms into an OLG-model with income heterogeneity within each cohort. 
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Moreover, the present analysis has not specified the policy responses to the reform effect on 
the fiscal gap. Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) show that lower tax rates reinforce the positive 
reform effects on employment and government finances.  
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Appendix 1: Fiscal effects of the pension reform under the most plausible 
assumptions 
 
Table A1.1. Fiscal effects of the pension reform. Percentage deviations between the 
government budget components in the reform scenario and the no-reform scenario 
(base). 
  2020 2040 2060 
Primary revenues 2.6 5.9 8.1 
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 2.5 7.5 11.3 
  Direct taxes from households 4.7 6.1 7.2 
  Social security taxes 2.0 4.3 5.5 
  Other revenues 1.0 4.7 9.5 
Primary expenditures 0.8 -2.2 -3.5 
  Transfers to households 1.7 -5.6 -8.1 
    Public old-age pensions -0.7 -15.9 -20.5 
  Government consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Other expenditures 1.3 0.7 -1.4 
Fiscal gap 28.9 -50.6 -38.2 
Memo 
   
Employment 2.3 5.4 7.1 
GDP, Mainland 2.4 6.2 8.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
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Table A1.2. Fiscal effects of the pension reform. Absolute deviations between the present 
values of government budget components in the reform scenario and the no-reform 
scenario (base). Billions 2010-NOK. Nominal discount rate = 4 percent.  
  2020 2040 2060 
Primary revenues 36 79 107 
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 10 31 43 
  Direct taxes from households 17 25 31 
  Social security taxes 6 15 21 
  Other revenues 3 8 12 
Primary expenditures 10 -35 -62 
  Transfers to households 9 -36 -60 
    Public old-age pensions -1 -51 -79 
  Government consumption 0 0 0 
  Other expenditures 1 1 -2 
Fiscal gap -26 -114 -169 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
Appendix 2: More results from the sensitivity analyses 
A2.1. Longevity 
Table A2.1. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under three 
different assumptions on longevity growth (High, Medium, Low). Percentage deviations 
between the new system and the old system (base).  
  2040 2060 
 
High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Primary revenues 6.7 5.9 4.5 10.0 8.1 5.5 
Primary expenditures -3.6 -2.2 -1.5 -5.3 -3.5 -1.6 
   Public old-age pensions -19.6 -15.9 -10.0 -26.2 -20.5 -9.9 
Employment 6.7 5.4 4.1 9.3 7.1 4.7 
GDP, Mainland 7.6 6.2 4.7 11.2 8.4 5.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
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Figure A2.1. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different 
assumptions about longevity growth (High, Medium and Low). Percentage deviations from 
the no-reform scenario.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
 
 
Figure A2.2. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about longevity 
growth (High, Medium, Low). Billion 2013-NOK.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
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A2.2. Delay of retirement 
 
Table A2.2. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under different 
assumptions about delayed retirement in the new system (Early, Main, Late). 
Percentage deviations between new system and old system (base).  
    2040     2060   
  Early  Main  Late  Early  Main  Late  
Primary revenues 0.1 5.9 7.9 -0.6 8.1 12.2 
Primary expenditures -3.1 -2.2 -2.5 -5.1 -3.5 -4.1 
   Public old-age pensions -17.9 -15.9 -15.7 -25.1 -20.5 -20.1 
Employment -0.1 5.4 7.6 -0.6 7.1 11.1 
GDP, Mainland -0.2 6.2 8.6 -0.6 8.4 13.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
 
Figure A2.3. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different 
assumptions about delayed retirement in the new system (Early, Main). Percentage deviations 
from the no-reform scenario.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
 
 
Figure A2.4. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about delayed 
retirement in the new system (Early, Main). Billion 2014-NOK.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
 
A2.3. Early withdrawal of benefits 
Table A2.3. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under different 
assumptions about early withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). 
Percentage deviations between new system and old system (base).  
    2040     2060   
  No  Medium  Max  No  Medium  Max  
Primary revenues 5.8 5.9 5.9 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Primary expenditures -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 -3.5 -3.5 -3.6 
   Public old-age pensions -16.5 -15.9 -15.3 -20.5 -20.5 -20.8 
        
Employment 5.4 5.4 5.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 
GDP, Mainland 6.2 6.2 6.2 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
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Figure A2.5. Reform effect on the normalized fiscal gap under different assumptions about 
early withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Absolute deviations 
between the new system and the old system (base). Percentage points  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
 
 
Figure A2.6. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different 
assumptions about early withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). 
Percentage deviations from the no-reform scenario.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
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Figure A2.7. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about early 
withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Billion 2014-NOK.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
 
A2.4. Protection of former disabled from the life expectancy adjustment 
Table A2.4. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under different 
assumptions about protection of former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy 
adjustment (No, half, full) in the new system. Percentage deviations between new system and 
old system (base).  
    2040     2060   
  No  Half Full No  Half Full 
Primary revenues 5.8 5.9 5.9 8.0 8.1 8.3 
Primary expenditures -2.6 -2.2 -1.8 -4.1 -3.5 -2.8 
   Public old-age pensions -17.8 -15.9 -13.8 -23.3 -20.5 -17.0 
Employment 5.4 5.4 5.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 
GDP, Mainland 6.2 6.2 6.2 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
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Figure A2.8. Reform effect on the normalized fiscal gap under different assumptions about 
protection of the former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy adjustment (No, 
Half, Full) in the new system. Absolute deviations between the new system and the old 
system (base). Percentage points.   
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART and DEMEC models 
 
 
 
Figure A2.9. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different 
assumptions about protection of the former disabled old-age pensioners from the life 
expectancy adjustment (No, Half, Full) in the new system. Percentage deviations from the no-
reform scenario.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
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Figure A2.10. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about protection of 
the former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy adjustment (No, Half, Full) in 
the new system. Billion 2014-NOK.  
Source: Authors’ calculations with the MOSART model 
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